The civil service pension scheme (CSPS) in Malaysia is a defined benefit (DB), non-contributory system directly funded from the budget. An aging population, rising life expectancy, and ballooning pension payments underscore the need for reform. An annual pension deficit model was used to estimate the pension deficit over a period of 75 years under eight scenarios that compare the current scheme with changes in the pension deficit when three policy variables-retirement age, contribution rate, and replacement rate-are manipulated. We found the current scheme will not be financially sustainable. By increasing the retirement age, introducing employee contributions, and reducing the replacement rate, it is possible to delay the emergence of deficits and lengthen the period of sustainability of the scheme. However, a radical makeover is necessary to be fully sustainable and this might not be politically feasible.
Introduction
The civil service pension scheme (CSPS) of Malaysia was inherited from Britain, because of the nation's colonial past. The CSPS is a generous defined benefit (DB), non-contributory scheme covering public sector workers who meet the eligibility criteria. Pension payments are financed from general revenue, although in 2007 a retirement fund called the after considering the current assets and liabilities. The long-term commitment, also known as implicit debt, refers to the ability to finance future payments of pensions, after considering future expenditures and revenues (Barr and Diamond 2009; Holzmann, Palacios, and Ziviniene 2004) . The concern here is that the CSPS, without any contribution from the employees, would eventually encounter problems in accumulating financial reserves for investing and may not get the required returns for continuous pension payouts (Lee 1997) . A pension fund deficit would mean that the collections in terms of contributions and returns to investments of the fund do not match pension payments. A rising pension deficit would not only suggest inadequate funds to meet pension liabilities but will also call into question the sustainability of the scheme itself. The pension deficit, expressed as a percentage of the GDP, measures the "financial gap" in the funding. This gap indicates the amount of pension debt (as a share of GDP) the government will need to finance when the pension fund falls short of liabilities (Yi 2011) .
Several proposals to reform the CSPS have in fact been proposed over the years; they include increasing the retirement age, asking new civil service recruits to opt for the EPF scheme instead, and converting the pension scheme to a contributory one. However, only raising the retirement age has been implemented. It was increased from 55 to 56 in 2001 and again to 58 in 2008 and finally to 60 years in 2012. This contrasts with the more extensive changes in pension schemes undertaken by countries elsewhere facing similar financing problems. In many cases, the reforms included parametric changes such as increasing the contribution rate or delaying the retirement age. The more difficult reforms involved systemic changes such as changing the defined benefit into a contributory system or moving from a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to a non-defined contribution (NDC) regime. For example, in the case of the civil service pension in Korea, the contribution rates by employees have been increased and the retirement benefits reduced (Mohan 2004) . In OECD countries, the following reforms have taken place: increases in pension age (Finland, Sweden) , restrictions on early retirement (Germany, Italy, Sweden), reductions in pension benefits (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal), integration of the civil service scheme with the general state scheme (Austria, Greece, Spain), and increases in contribution rates (Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden) (Palacios and Whitehouse 2006) . Reforms have also been implemented in several Asian countries including Japan (Sakamoto 2011) , Singapore (Asher and Bali 2012) , China (Leckie 2012) , and India (Kim and Bhardwaj 2011; Sane and Shah 2011) . The common elements of reform in most cases have been the changes made to the retirement age, contribution rates, and pension adequacy or the replacement rate.
While it is widely held that the CSPS is financially unsustainable, we are not aware of any study that has estimated the magnitude of the financial gap or suggested ways of closing it. To our knowledge there have only been two early studies on the CSPS; one explored the reasons why pension payouts were likely to grow over time and suggested the CSPS be converted into a contributory scheme to overcome the financing problem (Lee 1997) . The second estimated pension payouts when the retirement age is raised from 55 to 60 over a 10-year period, 1991-2000, and concluded that it was an effective way to reduce pension payments (Ibrahim and Siri 2012) .
In this paper, we utilized an annual pension deficit model developed by Yi (2011) to estimate the financial gap (over a period of 75 years) under eight scenarios, with the first being the baseline scenario where there are no interventions in the current scheme. The seven subsequent scenarios project gaps when three policy variables (the contribution rate, replacement rate, and retirement age) are tweaked. We confine attention to these three variables because they are in line with the reform experiences elsewhere and because they can be clearly manipulated by policymakers. Based on the results, we offer some policy suggestions to improve the financial sustainability of the CSPS.
The civil service pension scheme in Malaysia
The CSPS in Malaysia encompasses pensions for employees of the federal and state governments, statutory and local authorities, and the attorney general's chambers. Police and military personnel who have served for more than 21 years and officers holding a rank are also eligible for pensions via the CSPS, although the military has its own retirement scheme under the LTAT (or the Armed Forces Fund Board). The bulk of the pensioners consist of employees of the federal, state, statutory, and local authorities. The pension design includes pension payments, gratuity, and cash in lieu of leave and dependents' pension. With many changes over the years, the CSPS has become a rather generous scheme for of the civil servants.
The Pension Trust Fund (PTF) was therefore created in 1991, with a grant of RM 500 million from the federal government and a mandatory annual contribution from employers in the public sector. The federal government contributes 5 percent of the total annual budgeted emolument of federal employees while statutory bodies, local authorities, and agencies contribute 17.5 percent of the basic salaries of pensionable employees (Chua 2017) . Funds in the PTF, administered by the Pensions Trust Fund Council, grew from RM 500 million to RM 40 billion by 2006.
In March 2007 another body, KWAP (or the Pension Fund Incorporated), replaced the PTF to assist the federal government in meeting its future pension liabilities (KWAP 2013) . It was charged with determining the policy for the pension fund, managing the collection of individual contributions, executing and monitoring investments, managing members' accounts, and managing financial administration and pension payments (KWAP 2013) . The funds in KWAP stood at RM 50 billion in 2007 (KWAP 2013) and RM 126.8 billion as of 2016 (Chua 2017) .
Pension payments are increasing primarily because of three factors: wage increases to civil servants, expansion in the scope of pension benefits, and an enlarging civil service. Salary increases have been frequent and leading to higher pension payments. There have been upward adjustments in pensions not only to account for inflation but also to follow wage adjustments for the private sector employees. In 2000, a 10 percent increase in salary was given to all employees across the board and following that, another increase was made in 2002. A substantial revision in salary took place in 2007, in which the support group 2 (secondary school and lower certificate graduates) received a 35 percent increase and the support group 1 (diploma and high school graduates) was given a 25 percent increase. Those holding management and higher positions (Jawatan Utama Sektor Awam, JUSA, or Premium Grade for Public Sector) received 15 percent and 7.5 percent increments, respectively (Manaf 2010) . In 2012, the salaries of all groups were increased between 7 percent and 13 percent (Ahmad et al. 2012) . Since the pension is calculated on the last drawn salary, wage increases and changes in promotion procedures (such as time-based promotion) inevitably result in higher pension payouts. As of 2009, all those who have served for 30 years or more have their pensions calculated as 60 percent of the last drawn salary, while those with less than 30 years of service receive 20 percent of the last drawn salary. Pensions have also been increased by 2 percent annually to (partially) cover inflation since 1 January 2013. In 1995, the gratuity payment was increased from 5 percent to 7.5 percent of the last drawn salary. The pensioners also receive highly subsidized medical benefits (Narayanan 2002 ).
The scope of pension payments has also been broadened to include more dependents, unlike in the British era when dependents were not included (Sujata 2007) . For example, widows and widowers who remarry are now allowed to continue to receive the derivative pension, whereas previously pensions ceased on remarriage. Orphaned children are also eligible for a pension until they attain the age of 21 (JPA 2012).
The civil service itself has grown over the years and it is large relative to the population size. In 2012, the civil servants accounted for 5 percent of the population, exceeding that of other ASEAN countries like Thailand (3 percent), Indonesia (1.9 percent), the Philippines (1.5 percent), Vietnam (2.2 percent), and Singapore (2.4 percent) (ASEAN 2012). The major reason for this expansion is Malaysia's long-running affirmative action policy-one of the longest in the developing world-that benefits a group that constitutes the majority (and not the minority) in the population. The public sector has been used as a major conduit for absorbing Bumiputra (Malays and other indigenous groups) graduates into the modern sector, as part of this affirmative program (Embong 1996; Lau 2013; . It was estimated that Malays comprised 79 percent of the civil service in 2014 and the other indigenous groups made up another 11 percent (Pooi 2016) . Besides serving as a highly visible outcome of a "successful" affirmative action policy, the overwhelmingly Malay civil service has also proved to be a reliable vote bank that kept the incumbent government in power. A single Malay-led coalition has been in control at the federal level for over 60 years 
Note: a. Includes gratuity payments (or lump-sum payments received upon retirement).
b. Estimated figure given in source document.
since independence in 1957. 1 Thus, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the generosity of the pension scheme reflected the fact that it was used to serve the distributional objective of the affirmative action policy, and also, for partisan purposes. This may account for the apparent disregard for the efficiency, operation, and priorities of the CSPS. Table 1 indicates that between 2002 and 2014, the number of pensioners grew by 4.46 percent per year while dependents grew at a slower rate of 2.06 percent per annum. Thus, pension recipients (pensioners and dependents), grew at an annual average rate of 3.74 percent. For the same period, the average growth per annum of tax revenue was 7.5 percent (Ministry of Finance, MOF, various years). In striking contrast, pension payments during this period recorded a growth rate of 9.2 percent, outstripping the growth of both pension recipients as well as tax revenue. On a per capita basis, too, pension payments registered an annual average growth rate (5.6 percent) that was well ahead of the growth of total pension recipients. Clearly, if this trend continues, the CSPS will become financially unsustainable.
Not surprisingly, the financial burden of pension payments (measured in absolute terms) has risen over time. The spending on public pensions averaged about 1.7 percent of GDP between 2002 and 2014 ( Table 2 ) and exceeded that of neighboring countries like Indonesia (0.7 percent) and Thailand (1 percent) and matched that of the Philippines (1.7 percent), in 2010 (International Monetary Fund 2011). 
Methodology
We adopted the annual pension deficit model (APDM) developed by Yi (2011) to project pension deficits for state-owned enterprises in China. Admittedly, there are other models such as the pension reform options simulation toolkit (PROST) used by the World Bank and actuarial models (Boulier, Trussant, and Florens 1995; Haberman and Owadally 2001; Ramaswamy 2012 ). However, the PROST is not available for use by individual researchers while the actuarial models have elaborate data requirements that preclude their use by us. In contrast, the APDM only requires data on macroeconomic, demographic, and pension policy variables that are easily accessible or can be reasonably estimated.
The starting point of the APDM is the basic equilibrium condition that ensures the sustainability of a pension scheme (Becker and Paltsev 2001; Sin 2005) . This may be written as
where P (t) is the contribution rate in year t, B (t) is the replacement rate in year t, and d (t) is the pension scheme's dependency ratio. To assess the pension liability, the following equation was used (see the Appendix for details):
where n (t) is an indicator of annual pension deficit rate in year t; d 2(t) is the elderly dependency ratio, and c (t) is the ratio of participation in the pension scheme. When n (t) > 0, it implies a pension fund deficit, while n (t) < 0 suggests a pension fund surplus. The fund is balanced when n (t) = 0.
The financial gap shown by m (t) , or the annual pension deficit, as a percentage of GDP, is expressed as follows:
where (SG) t is the total wages as a percentage of GDP.
The annual pension deficit as a percentage of GDP (m t ) projected over the years, as explained in the next section, indicates the financial gap that the pension fund would generate over the years.
The model allows for three policy intervention variables that can be manipulated to reduce the pension deficit. By comparing the effect of each on the annual pension deficit, the policymaker is able to decide on the best option or even a combination of the three policy manipulations. The policy variables are (1) an increase in retirement age; (2) a reduction in the replacement rate; and (3) the introduction of contribution by employees (or raising the rate once contributions are introduced).
Variables and data
The model projects the pension deficit from 2006 to 2080, at 5-year intervals, using pension policy, demographic, and economic variables.
Pension policy variables P (t) is the contribution rate in year t, which is measured as

Average contribution to pension fund Total wages of all workers in the pension scheme in year t
. Note that labor force age group includes all who are aged 15 to 64 when the retirement age is set at 65, and includes all who are aged 15-59 when the retirement age is set at 60 years.
r (t) is the retirement rate in year t, which is R (t) Total number of persons over the age of retirement in the general population .
is the total number of retirees in year t:
The contribution rate is calculated by adding the statutory contribution of state and local government (17.5 percent) to the contribution from the federal government (5 percent) and a rate of return of 5 percent per annum (long-term interest rate). The replacement rate (B (t) ) is 60 percent for 30 years of service and above, or 20 percent for service of less than 30 years. This is based on the replacement rate for the civil servants in the pension system used in computing the benefit formula awarded to pensioners, according to their years of service. In our computations, we used 60 percent for all those who have completed 30 years.
When no changes in policy are made and the retirement age is set at 60 years, the labor force included all who are aged between 15 and 59. When we introduced the policy change of increasing the retirement age to 65 after 2020, the labor force was defined to include all who are aged between 15 and 64. This being the case, we used two different retirement rates (r (t) ).
The data for the number of workers, W (t) , were obtained from the Economic Report (MOF, various years). In this model, W (t) was assumed to be 10 percent of the labor force. The assumption approximated the average employment rate over a period of 21 years from 1990 to 2010. Public sector employment, in fact, averaged at 10.45 percent of the labor force during this period (MOF, various years).
The labor force in Malaysia was then estimated based on the growth rate from the World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (United Nations 2013). The United Nations (2013) data were used because it provided comprehensive data for all age groups.
The pension program participation rate (e (t) ) by the workers was calculated based on the different retirement ages.
The pension recipients consist of pensioners and dependents. The average growth rate of retirees, R (t) , for the years after 2014 was estimated at 3.45 percent per annum based on the average growth rate per annum from 2002 to 2014.
The ratio of participation in the CSPS (c (t) ) was then obtained from the ratio of
. Note that c (t) is the ratio of participation in the pension scheme (CSPS) of those who have retired and those who are still employed. This was used in all scenarios that maintained the retirement age at 60 years. The elderly dependency ratio, d 2(t) , is the number of people aged 60 and above being supported by the number of people in the labor force age group of 15-59. Multiplying d 2(t) by c (t) yields the pension scheme's dependency ratio (d (t) ). Over the years, c (t) will rise because as more workers retire, the numerator increases relative to the denominator. Since the model assumes that public sector employees comprise 10 percent of the labor force every year, c (t) rises along with d 2(t) , raising also the dependency rate of the pension scheme.
When the retirement age is assumed to be increased to 65 after 2020, c (t) , which is the ratio of r (t) e (t) , is estimated to decrease. This applied to all scenarios with the retirement age set at 65.
It is to be noted that the elderly dependency ratio (d 2(t) ), the ratio of participation in the pension scheme (c (t) ), and the pension scheme's dependency ratio (d (t) ) also change when the retirement age is increased to age 65. This is because the elderly dependency ratio (d 2(t) ) is now the number of people aged 65 and above being supported by the number of people in the labor force age group of 15-64.
The ratio of participation (c (t) ) in the pension scheme (CSPS) by those who have retired now starts from 65 and above while those who are still employed also changes and moves up to the age of 64; thus c (t) is assumed to drop by 1 linearly, after 2020 from the previous scenario. In other words, the ratio of retirees will fall with the increase in the age of retirement and the ratio of employees will increase. So, when c (t) is estimated to drop linearly by 1, this means that the drop in the ratio of retirees is matched by the increase in the number of workers in the pension program. Then d 2(t) multiplied by c (t) that gives the pension scheme's dependency ratio (d (t) ) also changes as a result of the above changes.
When the retirement age is set at 65, c (t) increases as workers retire, but the ratio of participation of retirees to employees will remain lower as compared with when the retirement age is fixed at 60 years. This is because when the retirement age is delayed, more employees continue working. The elderly dependency ratio (d 2(t) ) in this case will also be much lower than in the case where retirement occurs at 65. This is because raising the retirement age increases the number of working people while lowering the number of retirees, as retirement begins only after 65. Consequently, the pension scheme's dependency ratio (d (t) ) when retirement age is set at 65 will be lower than when retirement is set at 60 years.
Demographic variables
The demographic variables like the elderly dependency ratio and the changing age composition of the labor force were obtained from the World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (United Nations 2013). The population aged 15-59, 15-64, 60+, and 65+ were also obtained from the same source, based on the assumption that fertility and mortality rates will remain unchanged and there would be zero migration.
The elderly dependency ratio in year t, or d 2(t) , is defined as
Total number of persons over the average age of retirement
Total number of persons in the labour force age group .
Economic variables
The other economic variables such as the interest rate and wages were obtained from the KWAP Annual Report 2013 (KWAP 2013) and the official website of the Public Service Department (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia. Portal Pencen), respectively. This study employs the 5 percent annual rate of return as the base rate as stated in the annual report of KWAP (KWAP 2013) as the long-term interest rate. The annual rate of return determines the benefits in a defined benefit plan, thus the annual return at the base rate is used as the long-term interest rate as the asset's income.
The wages, (S (t) ), for the public sector employees are emoluments obtained from the MOF (1997 to 2013). The emoluments are assumed to be kept at 6 percent of GDP based on the data for the past 17 years (from 1997 to 2013). During this period emoluments ranged between 4.5 percent and 8.3 percent (MOF, various years). Table 3 .
Findings
The model was used to provide policy option projections for eight scenarios, stretching from 2006 to 2080. The baseline projection (Scenario 1) reflects the deficit the fund will face if it continues in its current form.
Scenario 1
This represents the existing scheme and served as the baseline situation. No changes were made to the pension variables: the retirement age remains at 60, the replacement rate (B (t) ) was kept at 0.6, and contribution rate (P (t) ) was set at 0.275. Figure 1 shows the rise of the pension deficit rate (n (t) ), which expresses deficit as a proportion to wages. The deficit rate rises gradually up to 2050 and then rises rapidly afterward. The possible reasons for this are that after 2050, the population of people aged 60 and above and the number of retirees rise substantially.
The deficit indicates that the revenues earned and collected are not adequate to support the pension payments. A continuous deficit makes the scheme unsustainable. When the fund is not able to sustain itself, it will drain resources from the budget or public revenues. Scenario 1, therefore, illustrates that when no changes are made the pension deficit escalates to 187 percent of wage payments.
The pension deficit as a percentage of GDP measures the financial gap (Figure 2) . A huge financial gap of 11.27 percent of GDP is projected by 2080 if no changes are made to the scheme. This is about 5.6 times greater than the current share of pension payments as a percentage of GDP (about 2 percent).
The subsequent scenarios indicate the magnitude of change that occurs in the pension deficit rate and the financial gap when changes are made with respect to three policy variables-retirement age, replacement rate, and the contribution rate. Table 4 outlines the changes in variables under each of the eight scenarios and their impact on the pension deficit and the financial gap. 
Note: mt1 represents pension deficit as a percentage of GDP (m (t)
). • Retirement age increased from 60 to 65 Pension deficit rate (n2): 100 percent of wages Financial gap (mt2): 6.02 percent of GDP 3
• Reduction in replacement rate: Pension deficit rate (n3): 152 percent of wages (B(t)) reduced from 60 percent to 50 percent after 2020
Financial gap (mt3): 9.1 percent of GDP 4
• Increase in retirement age from 60 to 65 Pension deficit rate (n4): 79 percent of wages • Reduction in replacement rate:
Financial gap (mt4): 4.7 percent of GDP (B(t)) reduced from 60 percent to 50 percent after 2020 5
• Reduction in replacement rate from 60 percent to 50 percent after 2050
Pension deficit rate ( 
Scenario 2
In Scenario 2, all variables remain as they are in Scenario 1, with the only change being an increase in the retirement age to 65. The impact of this is to reduce the pension deficit and financial gap by almost one-half.
Scenario 3
In Scenario 3, the only change is that the replacement rate is reduced from 60 percent to 50 percent after 2020. The pension deficit rate and the financial gap is reduced as compared with the baseline situation, but the reductions are not as large as that noted in Scenario 2. This shows that reducing the replacement rate has a smaller effect on reducing the pension deficit.
Scenario 4
In Scenario 4, a combined policy of increasing the retirement age and reducing the replacement rate is implemented. This has a far more significant effect on reducing the pension deficit and the financial gap as compared with implementing any one of the two policy options.
Scenario 5
This looks at the impact of increasing the contribution rate by 10 percent and reducing the replacement rate. This net impact on reducing the pension deficit and the financial gap is smaller as compared with Scenario 4.
Scenario 6
This shows the effect of changing all three policy variables. The outcome is an improvement over that seen in Scenario 4 (Table 4 and Figure 3 ). Figure 3 illustrates the comparison using the various scenarios and shows that the financial gap is lowest in Scenario 6. The financial gap is estimated around 4.1 percent of GDP in 2080.
Scenario 7
This confirms that increasing the contribution rate along with increasing the retirement age is less effective unless the replacement rate is also reduced (Table 4) .
Scenario 8
This shows the effect of combining all three policies: further increasing the contribution rate to 20 percent, further reducing the replacement rate to 40 percent, and increasing the retirement age to 65. Not surprisingly, this yields the best outcome. As is evident from Figure 4 , the financial gap falls sooner (after 2020) and more dramatically under Scenario 8 and remains in surplus for far more years as compared with Scenarios 5 and 6, before the deficit emerges again. The pension deficit rate is finally reduced to 38 percent of wages (Table 4 ) and the financial gap to 2.2 percent of the GDP (Figure 4 ). Even in this "best case" scenario, the pension fund will still be in a deficit. The financial gap under Scenario 8 approximates the average expenditure on pensions as a proportion of GDP since 2009 (see Table 2 ).
Conclusion and policy implications
The study shows that with the current rate of contribution and benefits, the pension scheme is not sustainable. Our simulation exercises suggest that with the manipulation of three variables-increasing the retirement age, introducing the contribution rate, and reducing the replacement rate-it is possible to delay the emergence of the deficits and lengthen the period of sustainability of the scheme. Based on the findings in this study, the following measures are recommended to enhance the financial sustainability of the CSPS.
Increasing the retirement age
Increasing the retirement age is a potent measure in reducing pension deficit with little objections likely to be raised by stakeholders. This was already evident when the retirement age was raised on three previous occasions since 2001 (from 55 to 58 and, finally, to 60). Malaysia's retirement age (60 years) is still low compared with many countries like Singapore and the United Kingdom; they have raised the retirement age to 65, as part of their reforms to address the increase in life expectancy (Banks and Emmerson 2000; Rothenbacher 2004; Asher and Bali 2012) . Raising the retirement age to 65 is an option to be considered seriously.
Reducing the replacement rate
Reducing the replacement rate is another policy option but it has consequences in terms of equity since it can affect the pensions drawn by retirees on lower salary scales. Therefore, the reduction in the replacement rate is suggested only for those who have completed 30 years of service and therefore are eligible for 60 percent of their salary upon retirement. This is to ensure that the policy will not impoverish the pensioner as he/she would have attained a reasonable level of income. The World Bank suggests lowering the replacement rate to 40 percent (Holzmann and Hinz 2005) , and this option is worth considering for those higher up the salary scale since their larger final wages would ensure them large pensions. This policy has been adopted in the United Kingdom and has reduced the disparity in pension earnings between retirees at the top and lower ends. It also helps reduce the glaring gap between retirees in the public and private sectors (Banks and Emmerson 2000; Rothenbacher 2004 ).
Considering the objections that may arise from workers who may feel that their benefits are being taken away, the new policy could be administered to new recruits as was done successfully in India (Sane and Shah 2011; Kim and Bhardwaj 2011) .
Introducing and increasing the contribution rate
Contributions from the employees along with employers should be made mandatory as in the case of EPF. As illustrated in the findings, introducing (and increasing) the contribution rate would endow CSPS with surpluses for a longer period and add to its sustainability. With zero contribution from employees (as presently is the case), the pension deficit occurs earlier and it becomes unsustainable much sooner.
Since salaries in the public sector are comparable to the private sector (Manaf 2010) , serious consideration should be given to converting the current defined benefit (DB) scheme to a defined contribution (DC) scheme as was done in Singapore (Asher and Bali 2012) . The DC scheme that works with annuities for lifetime pensions would be more manageable instead of a DB scheme. This move has several advantages; first, it reduces the financial burden of the government as the sole funder of the CSPS. Second, it reduces dependence on the government as the main source of employment. Third, it will reduce the disparity in retirement schemes between the public and private sectors. Finally, government funds freed from supporting the CSPS can be channeled to improve the general welfare of the elderly as a whole, rather than just retired government servants.
Again, to decrease resistance to the idea of having to make direct contributions (when previously none was expected), it is suggested that it become a mandatory requirement only for new recruits of the civil service.
Introducing a basic state pension scheme
When considering a reduction in the replacement rate, some consideration also has to be given to the goals of adequacy. With rising life expectancy, Malaysia will see more elderly population who may not be adequately covered, especially in some private and informal sectors (Mohd et al. 2016) . In this context, implementing a basic state pension for all elderly after the age of 65, as was done in the United Kingdom, will help ease the issue of adequacy when reducing the replacement rate in the CSPS. Introducing a basic state pension can be viewed as a universal scheme covering the elderly, irrespective of occupation (Mohd et al. 2016 ). Implementation of this may be done by pooling a percentage contribution to a national scheme by all the working population as in the United Kingdom. A basic state pension is also part of the multipillar framework recommended by the World Bank to avoid inadequacy.
Even if the recommendations above are implemented, the pension deficit will rise, albeit more slowly, and the deficit at the end of 2080 will also be modest and comparable to the current level. Furthermore, there will be significant surpluses in the intervening period.
For the pension scheme to be self-financing, the pension scheme has to be overhauled completely not only to make it a contributory scheme but also to scale down the replacement rate and the scope of the derivative pensions. Furthermore, the civil service also has to be downsized. Given the large civil service, traditionally viewed as a vote bank that keeps the incumbent government in power, such measures are unlikely to be adopted as they are politically risky.
Even the relatively minor adjustments suggested here are likely to invoke protests. Carone et al. (2016) noted that the experience in the majority of the EU states has shown that measures to enhance the sustainability of the public pension scheme invariably results in a reduction in the generosity of the scheme for future generations of pensioners. They, therefore, recommend other auxilliary measures to soften the resistance to pension reforms. These measures could include boosting retirement incomes by extending working lives and offering flexible working arrangments to retirees so that they can continue to generate some post-retirement income. And as suggested above, provisions for private pension schemes and other social safety net arrangements to prevent financial distress in old age may also be necessary.
Dividing both sides by A (t) W (t) , the following equation is derived:
Therefore,
Since d (t) represents the ratio of retirees to workers in the public sector, which is actually the pension system's dependency ratio (the number of retirees that have to be supported by the working number of workers in the system),
it has a combined impact from changes in demography, pension policy, and also economic growth. As such, it is not easy to predict d (t) into the future. Hence, d (t) is decomposed into more easily predictable variables derived from existing data on population forecasts. The annual pension deficit rate, n (t) , given in equation (A.2) can be rewritten as
For our purposes,
can be rearranged as follows: Denoting the numerator as r (t) and the denominator as e (t) , it can be rewritten as n (t) = B (t) d 2(t) r (t) e (t) − P (t) (A.4) Equation (A.4) is a simple step to calculating the future pension deficits based on the estimates of the demographic variable, which is the elderly dependency ratio (d 2 (t) ) and four pension variables: replacement rate (B (t) ), retirement rate (r (t) ), pension program participation rate (e (t) ), and contribution rate (P (t) ).
r (t) e (t) can be denoted as c (t) .
In many developing countries, data for r (t) and e (t) are not available; the estimates of n (t) , d 2(t) , B (t) , and P (t) for some initial year can be used to calculate r (t) e (t) , also denoted as c (t) , which is the ratio of retirement rate to the pension program participation rate. As such, c (t) becomes "a valid model parameter" that shows the ratio of the participation of the old (retirees) and the young (workers) in the pension program. If the c (t) is equal to 1, it means the pension program participation between those retired and those working are in equilibrium. If c (t) is greater than 1, it means that there are more retired participants in the pension program. Thus equation (A.4) can be rewritten as n (t) = B (t) d 2(t) c (t) − P (t) .
(A.5) n (t) > 0 means there is a pension fund deficit n (t) < 0 means there is a pension fund surplus n (t) = 0 means the pension deficit is zero or the fund is balanced
Since n (t) is an indicator of annual pension deficit rate in year t, with a further step, m (t) which is the annual pension deficit as a percent of GDP, also known as the financial gap, can be specified.
If total wages as a percentage of GDP is (SG) t , then m (t) = n (t) (SG) (t) , m (t) = B (t) d 2(t) c (t) − P (t) (SG) (t) . (A.6) 
